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Incidenti aerei

Boeing 737-800 MAX, il Final Report KNKT del volo Lion Air 610

Dopo 12 mesi dall'incidente l'analisi: in 322 pagine!

Il Final Report pubblicato dal Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT) Indonesiano evidenzia la serie dei riscontri che hanno determinato preceduto il crash in mare subito dopo il decollo del Lion Air, volo 610, del Boeing 737 MAX 8. Il volo decollato dal Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Indonesia, con 189 occupanti e quello storico incidente sarebbe correlato al malfunzionamneto dell'aletta identificata nello SPEED TRIM FAIL e nell'illuminazione del segnale  MACH TRIM FAIL.

Il Final Report in premessa sostiene:

“This Final Report is published by the Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT), Transportation Building, 3 rd Floor, Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5 Jakarta 10110, Indonesia. The report is based upon the investigation carried out by the KNKT in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Indonesian Aviation Act (UU No. 1/2009) and Government Regulation (PP No. 62/2013). Readers are advised that the KNKT investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing aviation safety. Consequently, the KNKT reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purpose. As the KNKT believes that safety information is of greatest value if it is passed on for the use of others, readers are encouraged to copy or reprint for further distribution, acknowledging the KNKT as the source.”

Nelle conclusioni, dopo aver rilevato i seguenti 89 riscontri – Findings:

Findings are statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in the

accident sequence. The findings are significant steps in the accident sequence, but

they are not always causal, or indicate deficiencies. Some findings point out the

conditions that pre-existed the accident sequence, but they are usually essential to

the understanding of the occurrence, usually in chronological order.

The KNKT identified findings as follows:

1. MCAS is designed to function only during manual flight (autopilot not

engaged), with the aircraft’s flaps up, at an elevated AOA. As the

development of the 737-8 (MAX) progressed, the MCAS function was

expanded to low Mach numbers and increased to maximum MCAS command

limit of 2.5 of stabilizer movement.

2. During the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), unintended MCAScommanded stabilizer movement was considered a failure condition with

Major effect in the normal flight envelope. The assessment of Major did not

require Boeing to more rigorously analyze the failure condition in the safety

analysis using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree

Analysis (FTA), as these are only required for Hazardous or Catastrophic

failure conditions.

3. Uncommanded MCAS function was considered Major during the FHA.

Boeing reasoned that such a failure could be countered by using elevator

alone. In addition, stabilizer trim is available to offload column forces, and

stabilizer cutout is also available but not required to counter failure.

4. FMEA would have been able to identify single-point and latent failures which

have significant effects as in the case of MCAS design. It also provides

significant insight into means for detecting identified failures, flight crew

impact on resolution of failure effect, maintenance impact on isolation of

failure and corresponding restitution of system.

5. Boeing conducted the FHA assessment based on the FAA guidance and was

also based on an assumption that the flight crew was highly reliable to

respond correctly and in time within 3 seconds. The assessment was that each

MCAS input could be controlled with control column alone and subsequently

re-trimmed to zero column force while maintaining flight path.

6. The flight crew did not react to MCAS activation but to the increasing force

on the control column. Since the flight crew initially countered the MCAS

command using control column, the longer response time for making electric

stabilizer trim inputs was understandable.

7. During the accident and previous LNI043 flights, the flight crew initially

responded by pulling back on the control column, however, they did not

consistently trim out the resulting column forces as had been assumed. As a

result the Boeing assumption was different from the flight crew behavior in

responding to MCAS activation.

8. During FHA, the simulator test had never considered a scenario in which the

MCAS activation allowed the stabilizer movement to reach the maximum

MCAS limit of 2.5 degrees. Repetitive MCAS activations without adequate

trim reaction by the flight crew would make the stabilizer move to maximum

deflection and escalate the flight crew workload and hence failure effects

should have been reconsidered. Therefore, their combined flight deck effects

were not evaluated.

9. In the event of multiple MCAS activations with repeated electric trim inputs

by flight crew without sufficient response to return the aircraft to a trimmed

state, the control column force to maintain level flight could eventually

increase to a level where control forces alone may not be adequate to control

the aircraft. The cumulative mis-trim could not be countered by using

elevator alone which is contrary to the Boeing assumption during FHA.

10. Any out of trim condition which is not properly corrected would lead the

flight crew into a situation that makes it more difficult for them to maintain

desired attitude of the aircraft. The flight crews in both the accident flight and

the previous flight had difficulty maintaining flight path during multiple

MCAS activations.

11. The procedure of runaway stabilizer was not reintroduced during transition

training and there was no immediate indication available to the flight crew to

be able to directly correlate the uncommanded nose down stabilizer to the

procedure. Therefore, the assumption of relying on trained crew procedures to

implement memory items was inappropriate

12. During the accident flight, multiple alerts and indications occurred which

increased flight crew’s workload. This obscured the problem and the flight

crew could not arrive at a solution during the initial or subsequent automatic

aircraft nose down stabilizer trim inputs, such as performing the runaway

stabilizer procedure or continuing to use electric trim to reduce column forces

and maintain level flight.

13. In the event of MCAS activation with manual electric trim inputs by the flight

crew, the MCAS function will reset which can lead to subsequent MCAS

activations. To recover, the flight crew has 3 options to respond, if one of

these 3 responses is not used, it may result in a miss-trimmed condition that

cannot be controlled.

14. The flight crew of LNI043 eventually observed and recognized the uncommanded stabilizer movement and moved the stabilizer trim cutout

switches to the cutout position. Stopping the stabilizer movement enabled the

flight crew to continue the flight using manual trim wheel to control stabilizer

position. On that flight, stabilizer cutout was used to counter the repetitive

MCAS-commanded stabilizer. Boeing reasoning that the stabilizer cutout is

available but not required is incorrect.

15. Boeing considered that the loss of one AOA and erroneous AOA as two

independent events with distinct probabilities. The combined failure event

probability was assessed as beyond extremely improbable, hence complying

with the safety requirements for the Air Data System. However, the design of

MCAS relying on input from a single AOA sensor, made this Flight Control

System susceptible to a single failure of AOA malfunction.

16. During the single and multiple failure analysis from the air data system worst

case scenario of “failure of one AOA followed by erroneous AOA”, Boeing

concluded that the effect would be hazardous until the flight crew recognized

the problem and took appropriate action to mitigate it. Since the training or

the guidance for actions taken in such situation were not provided, the effect

category should have remained hazardous.

17. Since the FCC controlling the MCAS is dependent on a single AOA source,

the MCAS contribution to cumulative AOA effects should have been

assessed.

18. The MCAS software uses input from a single AOA sensor only. Certain

failures or anomalies of the AOA sensor corresponding to the master FCC

controlling STS can generate an unintended activation of MCAS. Anticipated

flight crew response including aircraft nose up (ANU) electric trim

commands (which reset MCAS) may cause the flight crew difficultly in

controlling the aircraft.

19. The MCAS architecture with redundant AOA inputs for MCAS could have

been considered but was not required based on the FHA classification of

Major.

20. If the probability of an undesirable failure condition is not below the

maximum allowable probability for that category of hazard, redesign of the

system should be considered. If the uncommanded MCAS failure condition

had been assessed as more severe than Major, the decision to rely on single

AOA sensor should have been avoided.

21. The DFDR data indicated that during the last phase of the flight, the aircraft

descended and could not be controlled. Column forces exceeded 100 pounds,

which is more than the 75-pound limit set by the regulation (14 CFR 25.143).

22. Pulling back on the column normally interrupts any electric stabilizer aircraft

nose-down command, but for the 737-8 (MAX) with MCAS operating, that

control column cutout function is disabled.

23. During the accident flight erroneous inputs, as a result of the misaligned

resolvers, from the AOA sensor resulted in several fault messages (IAS

DISAGREE, ALT DISAGREE on the PFDs, and Feel Differential Pressure

light) and activation of MCAS that affected the flight crew’s understanding

and awareness of the situation.

24. The stick shaker activated continuously after lift-off and the noise could have

interfered with the flight crew hearing the sound of the stabilizer trim wheel

spinning during MCAS operations. Therefore, the movement of stabilizer

wheel might not have been recognized by the flight crew.

25. The aircraft design should provide the flight crew with information and alerts

to help them understand the system and know how to resolve potential issues.

26. Boeing did not submit the required documentation and the FAA did not

sufficiently oversee Boeing ODA. Without documenting the updated analysis

in the stabilizer SSA document, the FAA flight control systems specialists

may not have been aware of the design change.

27. Boeing considered that MCAS function is automatic, the procedure required

to respond to any MCAS function was no different than the existing

procedures and that crews were not expected to encounter MCAS in normal

operation therefor Boeing did not consider the failure scenario seen on the

accident flight. The investigation believes that the effect of erroneous MCAS

function was startling to the flight crews.

28. The investigation believes that flight crew should have been made aware of

MCAS which would have provided them with awareness of the system and

increase their chances of being able to mitigate the consequences of multiple

activations in the accident scenario.

29. Without understanding of MCAS and reactivation after release the electric

trim, the flight crew was running out of time to find a solution before the

repetitive MCAS activations without fully retrimming the aircraft placed the

aircraft into in an extreme nose-down attitude that the flight crew was unable

to recover from.

30. Flight crew training would have supported the recognition of abnormal

situations and appropriate flight crew action. Boeing did not provide

information and additional training requirements for the 737-8 (MAX) since

the condition was considered similar to previous 737 models.

31. The aircraft should have included the intended AOA DISAGREE alert

message functionally, which was installed on 737 NG aircraft. Boeing and the

FAA should ensure that new and changed aircraft design are properly

described, analyzed, and certified.

32. The absence of an AOA Disagree message made it more difficult for the

flight crew to diagnose the failure and for maintenance to diagnose and

correct the failure.

33. For the safety assessment of aircraft systems, the 14 FAR 25.1309 set the

requirements for the design and installation of systems which include analysis

of effects and probabilities of single, multiple and combined failures of

systems. It assumed that flight crew would correctly respond to flight

conditions in case of such failures. Human error is not included in the

probability analysis, even though the flight crew is often used as a means to

mitigate a failure condition.

34. When performing safety assessments to comply with 14 FAR 25.1309,

Boeing followed the procedures set in FAA AC 25.1309-1A and the SAE

ARP 4761 as the acceptable means of compliance. When doing the analysis,

Boeing assumed that the flight crew are completely reliable and would

respond correctly and appropriately to the situations in time. During the

accident and previous LNI043 flights, some of these assumptions were

incorrect, since the flight crew responded differently from what was expected.

35. 14 FAR 25.671 (c) requires that probable malfunctions of the flight control

system must be capable of being readily counteracted by the flight crew. This

necessitates that normal flight crew should be able to readily identify

problems and respond quickly to mitigate them. However, during the accident

flight multiple alerts and indications concealed the actual problem and made

it difficult for the flight crew to understand and mitigate it.

36. The Flight Standardization Board (FSB) process for the Boeing 737-8 (MAX)

utilized airline line pilots to help ensure the requirements are operationally

representative. The FAA and OEMs should re-evaluate their assumptions for

what constitutes an average flight crew’s basic skill and what level of systems

knowledge a ‘properly trained average pilot’ has when encountering failures.

37. In the accident flight, the system malfunction led to a series of aircraft and

flight crew interactions which the flight crew did not understand or know how

to resolve. It is the flight crew response assumptions in the initial design

process which, coupled with the repetitive MCAS activations, turned out to

be incorrect and inconsistent with the FHA classification of Major.

38. The first problem reported on PK-LQP aircraft of SPD and ALT flags

appeared on Captain’s PFD occurred on 26 October 2018 during the flight

from Tianjin to Manado and reappeared 3 times within 5 flight sectors.

209

39. The SPD and ALT flag did not occur on the flight from Denpasar to Lombok

and return. This was consistent with the result of AOA sensor examination

which indicated that the resolver 2 became unreliable during cold

temperature.

40. The engineer in Manado suggested to the flight crew to continue the flight as

problem rectification would be better to be performed in Denpasar and

considering that the SPD and ALT flags had no longer appeared on the

Captain’s PFD. This indicated that the aircraft was released with known

possible recurring problem.

41. On the flight from Manado to Denpasar on 28 October 2018, the DFDR

recorded the A/T disengaged on takeoff roll and the SPD and ALT flags on

the captain’s PFD most likely had appeared after the engine start. The

altimeter and speed indicator are airworthiness related instruments and must

be serviceable for dispatch. The decision to continue the flight was contrary

to the company procedure.

42. The engineer in Denpasar considered that the problem had appeared

repeatedly and decided to replace the left AOA sensor. Replacement of AOA

sensor proved to be the solution to rectify the SPD and ALT flags that were

reported to have appeared on the Captain’s PFD, however the installed AOA

sensor was misaligned by about 21° and resulted in different problems.

43. The Boeing test result indicated that a misaligned AOA sensor would not pass

the installation test as the AOA values shown on the SMYD computer were

out of tolerance and “AOA SENSR INVALID” message appeared in the

SMYD BITE module. This test and subsequent testing verified that the

alternate method of the installation test could identify a 20 or 21° bias in the

AOA sensor.

44. Comparing the results of the installation test in Denpasar and Boeing, the

investigation could not determine that the AOA sensor installation test

conducted in Denpasar with any certainty.

45. The BAT LMPM required the engineer to record the test values to ensure that

the test results were within tolerance. The engineer did not record the value of

the AOA angle deflection during the AOA sensor installation test. Therefore,

neither BAT nor Lion Air identified that the documentation had not been

filled out.

46. After LNI043 was airborne, the left control column stick shaker was active

and several messages appeared. The Captain of LNI043 was aware to the

aircraft condition after discussion with the engineer in Denpasar. This

awareness helped the Captain to make proper problem identification.

47. The Captain action of transferring the control prior to crosscheck of the

instruments may have indicated that the Captain generally was aware of the

repetitive previous problem of SPD and ALT flags and the replacement of the

left AOA sensor on this aircraft.

48. The LNI043 flight crew performed NNC of Runaway Stabilizer Trim by

selecting the STAB TRIM switches to cut-out, which resulted in termination

of AND activations by MCAS, and the aircraft became under control with

consequences of inability to engage the autopilot, and requirement for manual

operation of stabilizer trim by hand.

49. The Captain’s decision to continue to the destination was based on the fact

that a requirement to “land-at-the-nearest-suitable-airport” in the three NonNormal-Checklists was absent.

50. The Captain of LNI043 felt confident to continue the flight to the destination

because the aircraft was controllable and the expected weather along the route

and at the destination was good.

51. The LNI043 flight crew decision to continue with stick shaker active is not

common in comparison to previous events of erroneous stick shaker. When

combined with the runaway stabilizer situation recognized by the flight crew,

the decision to continue was highly unusual.

52. During the descent to destination they requested uninterrupted descent path

profile. This action suggested that the flight crew were aware of their existing

flight condition (continuous stick shaker, manual flying, manual trimming,

FO PFD was the primary instrument) required a simplified flight path

management until approach and landing.

53. During flight, the Captain of LNI043 kept the fasten seat belt sign on and

asked the deadheading flight crew to assist the cockpit tasks. These actions

indicated that the Captain was aware of the need to use all available resources

to alleviate the matter to complete the flight to the destination, despite the

increased workload and stressful situation.

54. The AFML entry for LNI043, which did not contain additional details about

what was experienced, was not in accordance with company guidance

provided in OM-Part A, Section 11.4.9 which lists reportable events to

include “Warning or alert, including flight control warnings, door warnings,

stall warning (stick-shaker), fire/smoke/fumes warning.”

55. The SS Directorate did not notice the occurrence since the report was filed

outside normal office hours and the report to SS Directorate was not

processed until the office hours on the following day.

56. The insufficient SMS training and inability of the employees to identify the

hazard might also be indicated by the incomplete post-flight report of the

problems that occurred on LNI043. The incomplete report became a hazard as

the known or suspected defects were not reported which might make the

engineer unable to properly maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft.

57. Content of the report did not trigger the Duty Management Pilot to assess this

as a Serious Incident and enable a safety investigation. The risk of the

problems that occurred on the flight LNI043 were not assessed to be

considered as a hazard on the subsequent flight.

58. The LNI043 flight that experienced multiple malfunctions were considered

caused or could have caused difficulties in controlling the aircraft. According

to the ICAO Annex 13, CASR part 830 and OM-part A, the flight is classified

as serious incident which required investigation by the KNKT in accordance

with the Aviation Law Number 1 of 2009 and Government Decree Number

62 of 2013.

59. The definition of an aircraft repetitive problem was different between Lion

Air CMM and BAT AMOQSM. This difference indicated that the Lion Air

did not monitor the repetitive problem policy of the BAT as a subcontracted

entity.

60. The requirement to report all known and suspected defects is very critical for

engineering to be able to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft.

61. The fault code was not documented in the AFML. The engineer did not

record the maintenance message that appeared in the OMF in the AFML.

Being unaware of the maintenance message and the fault code, this would

increase the difficulty for trouble shooting by the engineer.

62. The IFIM tasks of “ALT DISAGREE” and “IAS DISAGREE” have

repetition on the leak test in steps (3) and (4) as they are referring to the same

AMM tasks. This repetition was inefficiency and does not contribute to the

problem solving.

63. The inhibited AOA DISAGREE message contributed to the inability of the

engineer to rectify the problems that occurred on the LNI043 flight which

were caused by AOA sensor bias.

64. The lack of an AOA DISAGREE message did not match the Boeing system

description that was the basis for certifying the aircraft design. The software

not having the intended functionality was not detected by Boeing nor the

FAA during development and certification of the 737-8 MAX before the

aircraft had entered service.

65. During the LNI610 flight preparation, the CVR did not record flight crew

discussion about previous aircraft problems recorded in the AFML. This

might have made the flight crew of LNI610 would not be aware of aircraft

problems that might reappear during flight, including the stick shaker

activation and uncommanded AND trim. This would lead to the inability of

the flight crew to predict and be prepared to mitigate the events that might

occur.

66. Just after liftoff, the left stick shaker activated and numerous messages on the

PFD were displayed, repetitive MCAS activation after the flaps were

retracted and the ATCo communication increased the flight crew workload.

67. The FO asked the controller of the aircraft altitude and the indicated speed on

the ATC radar display in an attempt to obtain another source of information.

However, the ATC radar receives altitude data transmitted by the aircraft

therefore, no additional data may be acquired. Being unable to determine

reliable altitude and airspeed might increase stress to the flight crew.

68. The inability for the FO to perform memory items and locate the checklist in

the QRH in a timely manner indicated that the FO was not familiar with the

NNC. This condition was reappearance of misidentifying NNC which showed

on the FO’s training records.

69. Despite the flight crew’s attempt to execute the NNC, due to increased

workload, and distractions from the ATC communication, the NNC was

unable to be completed in that situation. The unfinished NNC made it

difficult for the flight crew of LNI610 to understand the aircraft problem and

how to mitigate the problem.

70. The reappearance of difficulty in aircraft handling identified during training

in the accident flight indicated that the Lion Air training rehearsal was not

effective.

71. The controller provided eight heading instructions after the flight crew

reported that the aircraft was experiencing a flight control problem, which

was not considered as an emergency condition according to ATS SOP of

AirNav Indonesia branch JATSC. There was also no objection by the flight

crew to the heading instructions and the flight crew did not declare an

emergency. These conditions increased the flight crew workload.

72. The absence of a declaration of urgency (PAN PAN) or emergency

(MAYDAY), or asking for special handling, resulted in the ATCo not

prioritizing that flight. With priority, ATC would not require LNI610 to

maneuver repeatedly.

73. The AOA DISAGREE message was inhibited on the accident aircraft

therefore, flight crews would not be aware that this message would not appear

if the AOA DISAGREE conditions were met. This would contribute to flight

crew being denied valid information about abnormal conditions being faced

and lead to a significant reduction in situational awareness by the flight crew.

74. No information about MCAS was given in the flight crew manuals and

MCAS was not included in the flight crew training. These made the flight

crew unaware of the MCAS system and its effects. There were no procedures

for mitigation in response to erroneous AOA.

75. Both flight crew of LNI610 being preoccupied with individual tasks indicated

that the crew coordination was not well performed. The Captain and FO did

not have a shared mental model of the situation as exhibited by their lack of

clear and effective communication. Most of the components of effective crew

coordination were not achieved, resulting in failure to achieve the common

goal of flying the aircraft safely.

76. During the multiple MCAS activations, the Captain managed to control the

aircraft altitude. The Captain did not verbalize to the FO the difficulty in

controlling the aircraft and the need for repeated aircraft nose up trim. The

FO was preoccupied with completing the NNC and not monitoring the flight

progress. Subsequently, the FO did not provide adequate electric trim to

counter multiple MCAS activations.

77. The requirement to describe specific handling situation to the flight crew

receiving the control was not required per Lion Air procedure or Indonesia

requirement. The absence of Captain’s specific description contributed to the

FO’s difficulty to understand the situation and may have contributed to his

inability to mitigate the problem.

78. The content of the manual of Lion Air and BAT contain several

inconsistencies, incompleteness, and unsynchronized procedures.

79. The investigation found that the engineers were prone to entering the problem

symptom reported by the flight crew in the IFIM first instead of reviewing the

OMF maintenance message. Conducting this method might lead the engineers

into the inappropriate rectification task.

80. The investigation found that all AFML pages received by the investigation

did not contain fault codes. The absence of the fault code reported by the

flight crew may increase the workload of the engineer and prolong the

rectification process.

81. The investigation considered that the amount of time to cover the hazard

identification topic in the SMS training syllabus was insufficient. This may

reduce the ability of employees to define and report a hazard.

82. A subsequent comparison of the accuracy specifications found that the Peak

SRI-201B API accuracy met the requirement stated on the CMM revision 8.

The investigation did not find a written instruction to operate the Peak

Electronics SRI-201B API.

83. Despite the lack of API specific written instructions for the alternate

equipment, Xtra Aerospace nevertheless obtained acceptance of their API

equipment equivalency report from the FAA FSDO. The lack of an API

written procedure was not detected by the FAA’s FSDO. This indicates

inadequacy of FAA oversight.

84. The Xtra Aerospace visit concluded that performing the required testing and

calibration defined in CMM Revision 8 using the Peak API could potentially

introduce a bias into both resolvers if the REL/ABS (Relative/Absolute)

switch on the Peak Electronics API was inadvertently positioned to REL.

85. The OMF has the history page which contains record of the aircraft problems

which can be utilized as a source for aircraft problem monitoring. The BAT

has not utilized the OMF information as the source of aircraft problem

monitoring.

86. On the subsequent flight, a 21 difference between left and right AOA sensors

was recorded on the DFDR, commencing shortly after the takeoff roll was

initiated. This immediate 21 delta indicated that the AOA sensor was most

likely improperly calibrated at Xtra Aerospace.

87. As noted, utilization of the Peak Model SRI-201B API by Xtra Aerospace for

the test and calibration of the 0861FL1 AOA sensor should have required a

written procedure to specify the proper position of the REL/ABS switch.

88. The aircraft was equipped with an airframe-mounted low frequency

underwater locator beacon (ULB) which operated at a frequency of 8.8 kHz.

The beacon was mounted on the forward side of the nose pressure bulkhead.

During the search phase, multiple surveys were conducted to detect a signal at

8.8 kHz, however no such signals were detected in the area where wreckage

was recovered.

89. On 10 March 2019, an accident related to failure of an AOA sensor occurred

involving a Boeing 737-8 (MAX) registered ET-AVJ operated by Ethiopian

Airlines for scheduled passenger flight from Addis Ababa Bole International

Airport (HAAB), Ethiopia to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK),

Kenya with flight number ET-302.

 

Ha riportato i seguenti “fattori rilevanti - Contributing Factors” che hanno determinato l'incidente:

 

“Contributing factors defines as actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a

combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced

the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the

consequences of the accident or incident. The presentation is based on

chronological order and not to show the degree of contribution.

1. During the design and certification of the Boeing 737-8 (MAX),

assumptions were made about flight crew response to malfunctions which,

even though consistent with current industry guidelines, turned out to be

incorrect.

2. Based on the incorrect assumptions about flight crew response and an

incomplete review of associated multiple flight deck effects, MCAS’s

reliance on a single sensor was deemed appropriate and met all certification

requirements.

3. MCAS was designed to rely on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable

to erroneous input from that sensor.

4. The absence of guidance on MCAS or more detailed use of trim in the flight

manuals and in flight crew training, made it more difficult for flight crews to

properly respond to uncommanded MCAS.

5. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not correctly enabled during Boeing 737-8

(MAX) development. As a result, it did not appear during flight with the

mis-calibrated AOA sensor, could not be documented by the flight crew and

was therefore not available to help maintenance identify the mis-calibrated

AOA sensor.

6. The replacement AOA sensor that was installed on the accident aircraft had

been mis-calibrated during an earlier repair. This mis-calibration was not

detected during the repair.

7. The investigation could not determine that the installation test of the AOA

sensor was performed properly. The mis-calibration was not detected.

8. Lack of documentation in the aircraft flight and maintenance log about the

continuous stick shaker and use of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC meant that

information was not available to the maintenance crew in Jakarta nor was it

available to the accident crew, making it more difficult for each to take the

appropriate actions.

9. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to

numerous ATC communications were not able to be effectively managed.

This was caused by the difficulty of the situation and performance in manual

handling, NNC execution, and flight crew communication, leading to

ineffective CRM application and workload management. These

performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared

during the accident flight.

data inserimento: Giovedì 31 Ottobre 2019


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Monopolio AeCI Aeroporto Venezia Art. 707 CdN Attentato Aviosuperfici Catullo EASA Emergency Impatto acustico Lavori in pista Risk assessment Ultraleggeri "118" 100 Compagnie 120 metri 13 km 16.300 16300 voli 17 Stormo 2002/49 CE 22.500 2250 kg 240 metri 300 mila/litri 31 Stormo 40 ANNI DOPO 46 Aerobrigata 46° Aerobrigata 60 Lva 60 decibel 65 decibel 65 Lca 65 Lva 65 dbl 65Lva 70 Lva 707 CdN 72° Stormo 75 La 75 Lva 75Lva 8 ottobre 2001 A 300 A 310 A 319 A 320 A 321 A 340 A 345 A 346 A 350 A 350 B3 A 380 A. Spessotto A.M.I. A320 AAIB AB 205 AB 206 ABD AIRPORT SpA ABeM AC ACI ACI Europe ACRP AD ADA ADP ADR ADS ADS-B ADUC AEA AEDES AEDT AERTRE AERTRE Comitati cittadini AESA AF 447 AGCM AGCOM AI Space AIA AIP Italia ALPA ALberghi AMI AMS AMSV AMX AMbientem Sottosuolo e suolo ANA ANAC ANASE ANAV ANCAI ANCI ANPAC ANPAV ANSC ANSV ANSV Safety ANSV; AeCI ANSV; Comitati ANSV; ENAC ANSV; Personale di volo ANSV; Ultraleggeri AOC AOPA APE APP APR APR. ENAC APR; Incidenti APT 26 APT 26A APU ARPA ARPA Lazio ARPA Lombardia ARPA Piemonte ARPA Veneto ARPAL ARPAS ARPAT ARPAV AS 350 AS 350 B3 AS315 Lama AS350 ASI ASL ASNV ATA ATC ATC Batter ATC Control ATC Milano ATI ATIS ATM ATM 07 ATR 42 ATR 42-500 ATR 72 ATS ATSB ATZ AUSL AV-88 Harrier AVCP AVES AVES Vega AVRO AVRO J85 AVifauna AW 109 AW 139 AW 609 AW119 AWHERO AZ 568 Aasaeroporti Ab 212 Abilitazione Abort take off Abruzzo Abu Dhabi Abuso d'ufficio AcDI Accoglienza Accordi Programma Accordo di Programma Acquacoltura Acque reflue Acrobazia Acustico Adana Addizionale Comunale Adiconsum Adusbef AeCI Aeobasi Aer Adria Aeradria Aerei Pilotaggio Remoto Aerei a pilotaggio remoto Aerei acrobatici Aerei arzilli Aereo critico Aereo riferimento Aereoporti Aermacchi Aermacchi 339 Aermacchi 346 Aermachi 339 Aero Club Friulano Aero Club Italia Aero Commander 520 AeroGaviota Aerobase Aerobase Comani Aerobase Latina Aerobasi Aerobasi; Mozioni Aerocampi Aeroclub Aeroclub Far East Aeroclub Friulano Aeroclub Italia Aeroclub. AeCI Aerodorica Aeroflot Aerohabitat Aerolinea Aerolinee Aeromexico Aeromezzi Pilotaggio Remoto Aeromobili Aeromodelli Aeromoili Pilotaggio Remoto Aeronautica Militare Italiana Aeronautica Italiana Aeronautica Militare Italiana Aeronautica militare Aerooorti Aeroporo Bergamo Aeroporo Capodichino Aeroporti Aeroporti Calabria Aeroporti Campani Aeroporti Militari Aeroporti Regionali Aeroporti Romani Aeroporti Sardi Aeroporti Toscani Aeroporti Toscano Aeroporti del Garda Aeroporti di Puglia Aeroporti interesse nazionale Aeroporti minori Aeroporti pericolosi Aeroporti siciliani Aeroporti strategici Aeroporto Aeroporto Firenze Aeroporto A. Canova Aeroporto Alghero Aeroporto Ancona Aeroporto Avana Aeroporto Bergamo Aeroporto Bologna Aeroporto Bolzano Aeroporto Boufarik Aeroporto Brescia Aeroporto Bresso Aeroporto Brindisi Aeroporto Cagliari Aeroporto Canova Aeroporto Capodichino Aeroporto Caselle Aeroporto Catania Aeroporto Catullo Aeroporto Ciampino Aeroporto Comiso Aeroporto Crotone Aeroporto Duca D'Aosta Aeroporto FVG Aeroporto Firenze Aeroporto Fiumicino Aeroporto Fontanarossa Aeroporto Forlì Aeroporto Forli Aeroporto Francoforte Aeroporto Gatwick Aeroporto Genova Aeroporto Gorizia Aeroporto Grazzanise Aeroporto Jacksonville Aeroporto Khartoum Aeroporto Lamezia Terme Aeroporto Lampedusa Aeroporto Linate Aeroporto Malpensa Aeroporto Messina Aeroporto Montichiari Aeroporto Mosca Aeroporto Moscardini Aeroporto Napoli Aeroporto Nizza Aeroporto Ordu Aeroporto Orio al Serio Aeroporto Palermo Aeroporto Pantelleria Aeroporto Parma Aeroporto Peretola Aeroporto Perugia Aeroporto Pescara Aeroporto Pisa Aeroporto Reggio Calabria Aeroporto Rimini Aeroporto Ronchi Aeroporto Ronchi dei Legionari Aeroporto Salerno Aeroporto Sheremetyevo Aeroporto Tessera Aeroporto Torino Aeroporto Trapani Aeroporto Treviso Aeroporto Trieste Aeroporto Urbe Aeroporto Venezia Aeroporto Verdi Aeroporto Verona Aeroporto Viterbo Aeroporto d'Amalfi Aeroporto dei Parchi Aeroporto del Parchi Aeroporto dell'Aquila Aeroporto dello Stretto Aeroporto di Bresso Aeroporto di Cagliari Aeroporto in mare Aeroporto sbagliato AeroportoTrieste Aeropoto Venezia Aeroproti Aerostato Aerostazione Aerostazioni Aerotaxi Aerotoxic Syndrome Aerovie Aerporti Aerroporti Aertraining Afragola Agenzia di Tutela della Salute Agrigento Agusta Agusta 109 Agusta Bell Agusta Westland AgustaWestland Aintitrust Air Algerie Air Berlin Air Canada Air Canada 759 Air Cargo Air Collision Air Dolomiti Air Force Air Force 1 Air Force Italy Air Force One Air Force Thunderbirds Air Frace Air France Air France 447 Air Italy Air Navy Air One Air Press Air Riminum Air Serbia Air Side Air Space Air Traffic Control Air Vallee Air crash Air noise Air show AirAsia AirHelp AirRiminum AirZest Airbase Airbus Airbus 220 Airbus 220/300 Airbus 230 Airbus 300 Airbus 319 Airbus 320 Airbus 320-200 Airbus 321 Airbus 330 Airbus 330 Alitalia Airbus 330-300 Airbus 332 Airbus 340 Airbus 340-451 Airbus 340-500 Airbus 340-541 Airbus 340-541. Aereo Presidenziale Airbus 350 Airbus 380 Airbus 400M Airbus 500-900 Airbus Industries Aircrash Aircrew Airgest Airiminum Airitaly Airlabs Airline Aironi Airprox UK Airshow Airside Airspace Airworthiness Directive Aiuti di Stato Ajax Al Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Jaza'eriya Ala rotante Albertini Alcool Alenia Alert Alert ULM Alert ULM. Ultraleggeri Alert VDS Alert laser Alessandro Manera Alghero Ali Nettuno Ali e coda Aliante Alianti Aliblue Malta Alisarda Alitalia All Nippon Allagamenti Allarme Allarme droni Allevamenti ittici Allevamento pesci Allevamento trote Allianz Allianz Assicurazioni Allungamento pista Allungamento piste Aloha Airlines Alpagu Alpi Svizzere Alta Velocità Alta tensione Amazon Ambasciata USA Ambiente Ambrosetti Amedeo d'Aosta Amendola Amerigo Vespucci Amianto Aminato Ammaloramento Ammaraggi Ammaraggio Amministrazioni Comunali Ampliamento Ampugnano Amsterdam Anacna Analisi epistemologica Analisi tossica Ancona Andrea Cascella Andrea Vallascas Andrea Zanoni Anidride carbonica Annesso XIV Annex Anonymous Antenne Anti Ice Anti droni Anti icing Anticorruzione Antigelo Antighiaccio Antiicing Antincendio Antitrust Antonella Litta Antonio Bordoni Antonio Canova Antonov Antonov 12 Antonov 148 Antonov 24 Antonov 26 Antonov 26B Antonov 32 Antonov AN 12 Apache Api Apnea Appalti Appalto Apple Appontaggio Apron Aquila Aquino Area ATA Arezzo Arianna >Spessotto Arianna Spessotto Arsago Seprio Art Art 58 Art 700 Art 711 Art 715 CdN Art. 707 Art. 707 CdN Art. 709 CN Art. 710 Art. 711 Art. 711 CdN Art. 715 Art. 715 CdN Art. 802 CdN Artificieri Arzilla Arzilli Arzillo Asbesto Asbestos Aseman Airlines Asfalto Asiago Asiana Asiana Airline Asiana Airlines Asili Asor Rosa Assaereo Assaeroporti Asse terrestre Assemblea Assicurazione Assicurazioni Assistenti di volo Assoaeroporti Assoavio Associazione Associazione Colognola per il suo Futuro Associazione VAS Prato Associazione diritti utenti e consumatori. Associazioni Assoeroporti Assoutenti Atitech Atlantia Atmosfair Attacchi cibernetici Attentati Attentato Atterra pista sbagliata Atterraggio Atterraggio emergenza Atterraggio in emergenza Atterraggio pesante Atterraggio senza carrello Atterraggio sulla pancia Attestati al volo Attestato Attestato al volo Attività sensibili Atto terroristico Autismo Autocostruito Autogiro Automation Automation desk Automatismi Automazione Autorità AntiCorruzione Autorità Garante Concorrenza Autorità Nazionale AntiCorruzione Autostrade Avannotti Avaria carrello Avaria idraulica Avaria motore Avaria pressurizzazione Avaria radio Aviano Aviapartner Aviation Environmental Design Tool Aviation Safety Network Aviation System Aviation Tpocis Aviation topics Aviazione Commerciale Aviazione Generale Aviazione civile Aviazione generale Aviazione leggera Aviazione turistico sportiva Aviofuel Aviolancio Aviomar Aviosupefici Aviosuperci Aviosuperficci Aviosuperfice Aviosuperfici Aviosuperficie Avola Avosuperfici Avro RJ85 Avvisi garanzia Avviso incendio Avvistamento Azienda Spaziale Italiana Aziende Incidente Rilevante Azzano Azzano San Paolo B BA 727 BAA BALPA BAPLA BAe 146 BEA BRI BRI² BRI2 BRexit BSCI BSCI-ENAC Bacini di traffico Bacino Calabria Bacino Nord Ovest Bacino di Bacino di traffico Bacino di utenza Bagagli Bagagli a mano Bagagli in stiva Bagagli incustoditi Bagnatica Baku Balance approach Balck Hawk Balzello Bandi Gara Bando ENAC Bando di Gara Barack Obama Barak Barcaroli Bardarbunga Bari Bari Palese Barra Barriera del suono Barriere Barriere antirumore Basi Basilea Bassa tensione Bassa visibilità Batterie Batterie Litio Batterie al Litio Battistoni Becco dell'Aquila Bedex Bedizzole Beech 200 King Beechcraft 33 Belle Air Belluno Belly landing Belpaese Benetton Benzina Bergamo Bergamo Orio al Serio Berlino Bernardino Bosello Bersani bis Bicocca Bidstrike Biella Biglietti Biglietti aerei Biglietto Bimotore Bio fuel Biocarburante Biofuel Bird strike Birdstrike Birdstrike Risk Index Birdstrike.it Birdstrile Birdstrke Committee Birdtrike Birdtrsike Birgenair 301 Birgi Birmania Birstrike Black List Airline Black list Blame Culture Blocco aterra Blocco spazio aereo Blocco voli Blos Blu Express Blu Panorama Blue Angels Squadron Blue Panorama Blue ice Body scanner Boeing Boeing 707 Boeing 727 Boeing 737 Boeing 737 800 MAX Boeing 737 8BK Boeing 737 NG Boeing 737-200 Boeing 737-400 Boeing 737-700 Boeing 737-800 Boeing 737-800 Max Boeing 737-MAX Boeing 740-400 Boeing 747 Boeing 747 - 400 Boeing 747 Cargo Boeing 757 Boeing 757-200 Boeing 767 Boeing 767 - 300 Boeing 767-300 Boeing 777 Boeing 777-200 Boeing 777-300 Boeing 787 Boeing 787-800 Boeing B 17G Boeing777 Malaysia Airline Bolgiano Bologna Bolzano Bomba a bordo Bomba day Bombardier Bombe Bombe belliche Bombe inesplose Bombe nucleari Bome belliche Bome inesplose Bonifica Bordano Borgo Cariola Boscomantico Bosello Boze Bozen Brain Istitute Brescia Bresso Bretella ferroviaria Brevetti Brevetto Brian Power-WAters Bridge Brina Brindisi British Airways British Medical Journal Bruno Barra Bruno Franchi Buffet onset Buffett onset Buk Telar Bulgarian Air Charter Burano Business Business City Business class Businessplan C C 130 C 130 J C 130H C 130J C 27J C-130 C-152 C02 C130J CAA CAA New Zealand CAAP CAEP CAI CANT 10 CDA CDM CDP CENSIS CFM 56 CFM56-7B CGA CH-53E Super Stallion CIG CISA CL 145 CNOSSOS-UE CNR CO CO 2 CO2 COA COMAIR COVEST CRDA CRI CRIAAC CRJ 200 CSA CTR CTU CUV CWY Ca Noghera Caccia Cacciabombardiere Cacciabombardieri Cagliari Cagliari Calcio Cagliari Helmas Caldato Camera dei Deputati Camera del Commercio Camere di Commercio Cameri Camion Campalto Campania Campi di volo Campionato Europei calcio 2016 Campo di volo Campoformido Canada Canada DHC 2 Canada DHC 3 Canadair Cancellazione Cancellazione voli Cancellazioni Cancelli Rossi Cancro Canguri Cannoncini Cannoni a gas Canova Cantone Caorle Capacità pista Capitanerie di Porto Capitolo 2 Capitolo 3 Capitolo 4 Capitolo2 Capodichino Capodimonte Capoterra Captain X Carabinieri Caravaggio Carburante Carburante avio Carburanti alternativi Cardi Cargo Cargo City Cargo hub Carico antropico Cariola Carlo Ghilardi Carlo Landi Carnia Carpatair Carrai Carrello Carrello bloccato Carrette Carrette dei cieli Carrette del cielo Carta Ostacoli Casalecchio Casalnuovo Casavatore Caschetto protettivo Casco Case Nuove Caselle Caselle Torinese Caserma Serini Casorate Casorate Sempione Casoria Cassa Depositi Prestiti Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Cassa integrazione Cassazione Castenedolo Catania Catania Catanoso Catchment area Categoria 4 Categoria A Catullo Catullo Spa Cavi alta tensione Cavi tranciati Ccatchent area Ccatchent areaAeroporti CdN Cedimento semicarrello Cedra Cellino Cellule solari Cenere vulcanica Ceneri vulcaniche Censimento Centrali nucleari Centralina Centraline Centraline di monitoraggio Centri commerciali Centro commerciale Cerberus Cernusco sul Naviglio Certificato di Aeroporto Certificazione Certificazioni Cessione Cessna Cessna 650 Cessna 150 Cessna 152 Cessna 172 Cessna 182P Cessna 208 Caravan Cessna 208B Cessna 210 Cessna 414 Cessna 441 Cessna 501 Cessna 640 Cessna 650 Cessna C 210 Cessna Citation Cessna Trigoria Challenger CL 604 Chapter 4 Check in Check point Check-in Cheetah Chetak Chi l'ha visto Chpater 3 Ciampino Cielo infinito Cigni Cimadolmo Ciminiere Cimiteri Cimitero verticale Cina Cinghiali Circolare APT 17 Circolare APT 33 Circolare Apt 26 Cirrus 20 Cirrus 22 Cirrus SR 22 Citation III Città Metropolitane Cittadella Cittadini City Airport City Liner City Regione Abruzzo Ciulli Clandestini Classifica Classifica aeroporti Classifica aeroporti peggiori Classificazione acustica Classificazione acustica comunale Claudio Calenda Claudio Eminente Clearway Climatologia Close in Club Areo Far East Campoformido Co branding Co maketing Co markeing Co-marketing Ryanair Co-marleting Coccia di Morto Cockpit Coda di cristallo Codacons Codice Rosso Codice della Navigazione Codice della Strada Codice di Navigaziome Codice di Navigazione Cold Case Collisione Collisione a terra Collisione in volo Collisioni Colognola Colombacci Colombia Colosseo Com.te Bosello Com.te Dentesano Com.te Renzo Dentesano Comandanti Comiso Comisssione aeroportuale Comitati Comitati Comitati cittadini Comitati no-fly-zone Comitati; Pagliano e Gori Comitati; Ricorso Comitato Comitato Aerei Varallo Pombia Comitato Aeroporto Treviso Comitato Ciampino Comitato Cittadini Varallo Pombia Comitato Colognola Comitato Fuoripista Comitato No Fly Zone Comitato Varallo Pombia Comitato cittadini Comitato cittadini TV ComitatoaeroportoTV Comitti Commander Commisione UE Commissari Alitalia Commissario Commissione Commissione Acustica Commissione Aeroportuale Commissione Trasporti Commissione UE Commissione VIA Commissione aeroportuale. Smart City Commissione aeroportuale.ENAC Commissione aeroportuali Commissione aeroprotuale Commissione di Valutazione Impatto Ambientale Commissione europea Commissioni Commissioni Aeroportuali Commissioni Parlamentari Commissioni aeroprotuali Como Compagnie aeree Compagnie tradizionali Compatibilità Compensazioni Competizione Complementare Computer Comte Bosello Comune Bologna Comune Ronchi dei Legionari Comune Signa Comune di Gorizia Comune di Milano Comune di Treviso Comuni Comuni aeroportuali Comunicati Comunicato Concessione Concessione ventennale Concessioni Concorrenza Cond Case Condizioni avverse Condizioni meteo avverse Confederazione Svizzera Conferenza Regioni Conferenza dei Servizi Conglomerato bituminoso Congo Connelly Consiglio Amminsitrazione Consiglio di Stato Consorzio Urbanistico Volontario Contagio Contaminazione Contaminazione carburante Continuità Territoriale Continuità territoriali Contratti di lavoro Contratti di programma Contratto di programma Contributi Contributi previdenziali Contributi pubblici Controlli Controllore Controllori ATC Controllori di volo Contromano Convegni Convegno Convertiplano Cooperative Coordinamento Comitati della Piana Coordinamento Piana Prato Pistoiia Coordinamento dei Comitati di Prato e Pistoia Copasir Coppi Coppi volanti Core Network Corpo Forestale Corrado Passera Correlazione Corriere della Sera Corrosione Corruzione Corsia Emergenza Corte Costituzionale Corte Giustizia Europea Corte Giustizia UE Corte UE Corte dei Conti Corte di Giustizia Corteo Corto medio raggio Corto raggio Corto-Medio raggio Corvus Phantom RG Costi operativi Costo euro/passeggero Cottarelli Crac Alitalia Cracks Crago Craig Whitlock Crash Crash risl Crew Crinature Crisi Cristian Flechter Croce Rossa Italiana Crotone Cuarnan Cuneo Curve di isorischio Curve di isorischio; Aeroporti Curve isofoniche Curve isorischio Cyber Attacks Cyber attack Cyber intelligence Cyber security Cyberattacks Cybersecurity D DAGC DC 3 DC 9 DC 9 30 DC3 DC9 DDL DEF 2012 DHC-2 Beaver DHC-6 DHC-8-402Q Dash 8 DJI DM 31-10-97 insiteriali DM 6 agosto DSB Dal Molin Danni cardiovascolari Dante Faraoni Dario Nardella Dario Romagnoli Darwin Airline Dash 8 Dassault Dati di traffico Dati di traffico 2015 De Ice De Icing De Lorenzis De Lorenzis Diego De Seta De snowing De-icing Deborah Serracchiani Decessi Decibel Decolli Decolli antirumore Decollo Decollo abortito Decollo antirumore Decompressione rapida Decreti Ministeriali Decreto Decreto Bersani Decreto Legislativo 17 febbraio 2017 n. 42 Decreto Lupi Decreto Ministeriale Decreto Presidenziale Deicing Delfino Delocalizzazioni Delta Airlines Deltaplano Demanio Demanio Militare Demolizione Demolizioni Dentesano Denuncia Depositi Depositi avio Depositi carburante Deposito Deposito avio Deposito carburante Depuratori Deroga Deroghe Detect and avoid Detector Di Giacomo Dia 20 Diagnosi medica Diamond Diego De Lorenzis Difesa Diffida Dimostrazione Diossina Direttiva Direttiva 2002/30 Direttiva 2015/996 Direttive Direttive AD Dirigibile Diritti aeroportuali Diritti d'imbarco Diritti di imbarco Diritti di traffico Diritti imbarco Diritti sindacali Dirottamenti Dirottamento Disabili Disastro aereo Discarica Discarica Siberie Discariche Disinnesco Dismissioni Disorientamento spaziale Dissequestro Disservizi Dissesto Distaccamento Distacco pannello Distacco ruota Distacco ruotino Distant Distributore benzina Distributore di benzina Distributori Distributori benzina Distributori di carburante Divieti Divieto Divieto ai voli Divieto al volo Divieto decolli Divieto imbarco Divieto notturni Divieto notturno Divieto voli Divieto voli notturni Divise Donesk Donne Ambientaliste Dornier 228-201 Dragon Fly Dreamlifter Dreamliner Drenaggio Droga Drone Drone Wars Droni Dronitaly Dubai Duca d'Aosta Due piste Dune Durango Dutyflightime E dreams EAC EADS EADT EAER EASA EASA; ANSV EASA; FAA EAafety Raccomandation ECA ECAC ECCAIRS EDMS EEA EGNOS EGNOS Sol EMAS EMAS. Strip EMS EMSA ENA ENAC ENAC Sussidi ENAC; ANSV ENAC; AeCI ENAC; Piano di Rischio aeronautico ENAV ENAV Accademy ENEL ENIT ERJ ESA ETFMS ETS EU EXPO 20015 East River Easy Jet EasyJet Ebola Ecoreati Ecotassa Effetti collaterali Effetto serra Egyptair Egyptair A 320 Egyptair Airline Egyptair MS804 Elams EliOssola Eliambulanza Elibasi Elicotteri Elicottero Eliporto Elisoccorso Elisuperfici Elitellina Elmas Embraer 145 Embraer 175 Embraer 190 Emendamento Emergency Emergency AD Emergency Airworthiness Directive Emergenza Emergenza carburante Emergenze Emiliano Emirates Emirates Aerline Emirates Airline Emissione fumi Emissione gassose Emissioni Emissioni acustiche Emissioni ambientali Emissioni elettromagnetiche Emissioni gassose Emissioni in atmosfera Emissioni inquinanti Emissioni sonore Enav Academy Energia solari Engineered Materials Arresting System Engineered Materials Arresting Systems Engineering Materials Arresting System Enhanced Tactical Flow Management System Enstrom 480B Ente Fiera Enti Locali Enti Pubblici Eolico Equa ripartizione Equipaggi Errore consapevole Errore intenzionale Errore umano Eruzione Eruzione vulcanica Esenzioni permanenti Esenzioni temporanee Esercenti Esercitazione Esercitazioni Esercitazioni interforze Esercito Esibizioni Esonerati Esplosione Esplosione Trigoria Esplosione batterie Esplosione fan Esplosione in decollo Esplosione in volo Esplosione motore Esplosione serbatoi Esposti Esposto Estensione carrello Esterino Montino Esyjet Eternit Ethiad Ethiad Airlines Etihad Etna Eurnekian Eurocontrol Eurocontrol ENAV Eurocopter Eurocopter AS 350B2 Eurocopter AS.350B-3 Eurofighter European Environment Agency (EEA) European Maritime Safety Agency Europilote Eurowings Evacuazione Evacuazione controllata Evacuazione emergenza Evacuazione incontrollata Executive Extra 300 Extra costi Extra tassa Extra voli Eyjafjallajokull F 100 F 104 F 15 F 16 F 18 F 22 F 35 F-2000 F-35 F-35 Lightning II F-PILI F/A 18 F2000 F2i F35 FAA FAA. ENAC FAI FAS FASTWEB FBI FDO FIC FILT FILT CGIL FIR FISH FIVL FIVU FOD FRAIT FSF FVG Fairchild 226 Falchi Falco Accame Falcognana Falcon 50 Falcon 7X Falconeria Falde Falde acquifere Falde idriche Fallimento Falsi allarmi Falso allarme Falso glide Fassina Fattore A Fattore umano Fauna Federal Administration Authority Federation of American Scientists Federico Fellini Federico Fellini Fel surcharge Fellini Ferie Fermo a terra Fermo flotta Fermo velivoli Ferretti Fertilia Final Report Finanziamenti Finmeccanica Fiorentina Fiorentina Calcio Fire retardant foam Firenza Firenze Fiume Il Sile Fiume Sile Fiumicino Fiumicino.Monopolio Flame out Flight Recorder Flightradar24 Flotta Flotta Airbus 320 Flotta Boeing 787 Flotta Civile Commerciale Flotta F 35 Flotta aerea Flotta arzilla Flotta italiana Flotta low cost Flotta militare Flotta rottamata Flotta vetusta Flotte aeree Flotte arzille Fly Jamaica Fly by Fly over FlySevus Focene Foggia Fokker 100 Fokker 27-500 Fokker 50 Fondo volo Fonometri Fontanarossa Fonte attrattiva Fonti attrattive Fonti inquinanti Foppolo Forlì Forlanini Forli Forteza Volante Forze Armate Franchi Franchigia Francoforte Fraport Fratture Cracks Frecce Tricolori Freccia Rossa Free Flight Free Route Airspace Free flight-route Fregene Frequenza Friuli Friuli Venezia Giulia Frosinone Fue dumping Fuel Fuel Tank Fuel Tanks Fuel contamination Fuel dumping Fuel economy Fuel policy Fuel remaining Fuel surcharge Fuelavio Fuggitivo Fuliggine Fulmini Fumo Fumo a bordo FuoriPista Fuoricampo Furbara Furti G 91 GAO GB Pastine GE GIP GOA GPIAAF GPS Gabbiani Gabbiano Galaxi Galaxy Galeazzo Bignami Galilei Galileo Galilei Gallo Sultano Gamberale Gara appalto Gara d'appalto Gas Serra Gate Gateway Gatwick Gemona del Friuli General Electric General Electric Engine Generale Roberto Nordio Genova Genova Sestri Geologico Germanwing Germanwings Gesac Gestione Gestione lamentele Gestioni aeroportuali Gestori Gestori aeroportuali Geyger Ghedi Gheppi Gheppio Ghiaccio Ghiaccio blu Giacarta Gianfranco Ciulli Ginevra Gino Lisa Giorgio Brandolin Giorgio Gori Giotto Giovanni Modugno Girotto Giubileo Giuseppe Daniele Carabba Giuseppe Leoni Glass cockpit Glicole Gomme scoppiate Goran Lilia Goran Svensson Gorizia Governo Governo Italiano Graded Area Graduatoria vettori Gran Sasso Grandine Grassobbio Graziano Del Rio Graziati Grazzanise Green Fuel Greenreport Greiser Grifoni Grimsvotn Grosseto Grottaglie Ground noise Gubitosi Guerre stellari Guidonia HC Hacker Haller Handicap Handler Handling Hans Kristensen Hard Landing Hazard Hazard identification Heatrhrow Heavy Heavy showers rain Helios Airways Helmas Hercules Hermes 900 Heron 1 Holzer Hostess Hotel Houston Huamn fators Hub Hudson Human cator Human error Human factor Human factors Human fators Hyena Hyplane I - TIGI I-GPES I-LUPU I-TALY I-TIGI I-UASC IAC IATA IATA; CO 2 IBAR ICAO ICAO 1 ICAO 13 km ICAO 2 ICAO A ICAO B ICAO; ENAC IFALPA IFTS IGLA IL 76 ILS ILS II ILS-Z ILVA INAIL INGV INM INM. Delocalizzare INPS IPhone 7 IRESA IRI ISDE ISIS ISS ITS IUAV Iberia Ictus Idrocarburi Idroplani Idrovolanti Il Cervello infinito Ilyushin Il-76 Imbarco prioritario Immigrati Immobili ImpaColognolatto acustico Impattio acustico Impatto acustico Impatto acsutico Impatto acustica Impatto acustico Impatto ambientale Impatto ambientale.ENAC Impatto atmosferico Impatto droni Impatto gassoso Impatto globale Impatto volatili Impianti biomasse Impianti ittici Imposta Regionale Emissione Sonore Aeromobili Imposta Regionale Emissioni Sonore Imposta Regionale Emissioni Sonore Aeroportuali Imposta Regionale Rumore Aereo Imposta acustica Imposta ambientale Imposta imbarco Imposta passeggeri Imposta passeggero Imposta rumore Imposta rumore aereo Imposte Imposte aeroportuali Imposte passeggeri Imposte rumore Imppato acustico Impronta acustica Imputazioni Inabissa Inabissato Inadempienze Inaer Incdenti Incendio Incendio batterie Inceneritori Incentivazione Incentivi Incentivi ai voli Incentivi al volo Inchiesta Inchieste Inchieste ANSV Inchieste di sicurezza Incident Incident databse Incidente Incidente aereo Incidenti Incidenti 2017 Incidenti AeCI Incidenti irrisolti Inconveniente Inconveniente grave Inconvenienti Inconvenienti gravi Indagine Indagine epidemiologica Indennizzi Indice affollamento Individual Risk Individul Risk Infezioni Infrazione Infrazione UE Inicdente Inicdenti Inottemperanze Input Inquinamento acustico Inquinamento aria Inquinamento atmosferico Inquinamento gassoso Inquinanti Inquinanti primari Inquinanti secondari Insubria Integrazioni Intercettamento Interferenze Interim Report Interpellanza Interpellanze Interrogazione Interrogazioni Interruzione decollo Inversione di spinta Investigatori Investigazione Investigazioni Ipertensione Ipossia Iran Iran ATR 72 Iran Air Islanda Isofoniche Isola Isola Elba Isola Lussino Isola artificiale Isola sull'acqua Isole Isole sull'acqua Isorischio Ispettorato Aeronautica Militare italiana Ispezioni Ispra Istituto Superiore Sanità Istituto Superiore Sanita Istrana Italia Nostra Italian Airlines Italian Airways Italian Safety List Itavia Itavia 870 Itticoltura Itticolture Ittiocoltura Izp Technologies JAA JP1 JP4 JSF Jet Jetfuel Joe Tacopina Joint Strike Fighter-F35 Joint Strike Fighter Jumper Jumping Junkers Jurong Aviation Park Just culture KC 130 KLM KMPG Kagu Kamikaze Kanck Kansai Karman Kathmandu Kilfrost Killfrost Kilotoni King Air Kite surfer Kobe Kpmg Kyoto L-410 LMA LMI-2933 LOT LTO La Comina La Repubblica La Sapienza La Tuscia Ladispoli Laguna Lagune Lamezia Terme Lancio Land side Landside Laptop Laser Laser verde Laser verdi Latina Laura Puppato Lavariano Layout Lazio Lden Ldnight Learjet 45 Lega Ambiente Lega Nord Legambiente Legge 447/95 Legge 58 1963 Legge Stabilità Leggi ambientali Leonardo Leonardo da Vinci Lepri Leq Let 410 Libero mercato Libia Libro Bianco Licenza Licenze Light Lightning II Lignano Lignano Sabbiadoro Limitazione ostacoli Limitazioni ostacoli Limite voli Limiti di pista Limiti di volo Linate Linate 2001 Linate 8 ottobre Lintae 2001 Linzone Lion Air Liquidi Lista nera Lista nera UE Litio Litorale Romano Liuzzi Livello safety Livingstone Lnd Lnight Lockheed Lockheed Martin Lodi Lodovico Sonego Lombardia Lonate Pozzolo Londra Londra Heathrow Long range Los Angeles Los Roques Low cost Low cost Low fare Low fuel quantity Lufhtansa Technik Lufthansa Luke afb Lunghezza Pista Lungo raggio Lupi Lva M 345 M 345 HET M 346 M-345 M5S MAC MAG 1 MAK MATT MB 326 MB 339 MB 346. AMI MCR R 180 MD 80 MD 80. Frecce Tricolori MD 82 MD 83 MD 87 MD80 MD83 MDA MEL METAR MH 370 MH17 MH370 MIT MMI MQ 9 Reaper MUOS Macao Maccarese Macron Madeira Madorli Magazzino bagagli Mahesh Panchavaktra Maison lumiere Malagrotta Malaisya Airlines Malasya Airlines Malasyan Airlines Malattia mentale Test psicologici Malaysia Airline Malaysia Airlines Malaysian Airlines Malignani Malla acustica Malore comandante Malori Malpella Seta Malpensa Mancata collisione Mandalay Manifestazione Manifestazione aerea Manifestazioni aeree Manufatti Manutentori Manutentori aeronautici Manutenzione Mappa Mappa acsutica Mappa acustica Mappa acustico Mappa ambientale Mappa dei vincoli Mappa di rischio Mappa gassoso Mappe acustiche Mappe di Vincolo Mappe vincoli Mappe vincolo Marchi Marco Polo Marconi Marconi Express Marghera Marina Marina Italiana Marina Japan Marina Militare Marina Militare Italiana Marina USA Marina di Campo Marine Marines Air Corps Marino Maristella Caldato Massimo Giannini Master Plan MasterPlan Masterpla Masterplan 2030 Masterplan dimezzato Masterplan. VIA Masutti Materiali pericolosi Matrice del rischio Matrice rischio Matteo Renzi Matteoli Maurizio Catino Maurizio Lupi Mauro Moretti Mauro Pili Mayday Mayday fuel Mediatore Europeo Medio raggio Mediobanca Meditteraneo Medium Melanoma Mensanello Mercafir Mercato Merce pericolose Mercurio Meridiana Meridina Merina Merna Merpati Mesotelioma Messa a terra Messo a Terra Metal detector Meteo Meteo avverse Meteorologia Mezzi a pilotaggio remoto Mezzi pilotaggio remoto Mezzo a pilotaggio remoto Microfessure Microfoni Microfono Mid air collision Mig 29 Milan Milano Milano ACC Minerva Miniliner Minimum fuel Minimun Equipment List Ministeri Ministero Ambiente Ministero Difesa Ministero Infrastrutture Ministero Infrastrutture e Trasporti Ministero Interno Ministero Trasporti Ministero Trasporti e Ambiente Ministero dei Trasporti Ministero delle Infrastrutture Ministri Ministro Ministro Costa Ministro Del Rio Ministro Infrastrutture Ministro Trasporti Ministro Trenta Minniti Mirage Mirage 2000 Missed collision Missile Missili Missili Nike Mistero Mistero di Ustica Mistral Air Mitigazione Mitigazioni Molo D Monaco Monaco di Baviera Moncenisio Moncucco Vische Monfalcone Mongolfiera Mongolfiere Monitoraggio Monitoraggio acustico Monitoraggio cenere Monopolio Monossido di carbonio Montagna Longa Monte Nambino Monte Serra Montezemolo Monti Monti dell'Ortaccio Montichiari Monzuno Motoalianti Motore Motori Movimenti Movimenti aerei Movimento 5 Stelle Moxy Mozione Mozioni Multa Myair NAC NADP NADP 1 NADP 2 NAPD NAPD 1 NAPD 2 NASA NATO NEOS NH 500 NH-500B NO AMX NOTAM NOx NSA NTSB Nanomateriali Nanotecnologie Nantes Napoli Napoli Capodichino Narcotraffico Nave Borsini Navetta Navy Seals Near collision Near miss Near missed collision Near misses Nettuno Network Neve New Livingston Nicola Bianchi Nicola Zaccheo Nicolo Romano Nike Nimby Nimis Niscemi No Flight Zone No Frills No drone zone No fly zone No raddoppio No-fly-zone Noise map Noise tax Nomisma Nomisna Norman Doidge Norwegian Air Norwegian Air Shuttle Norwegian Airlines Note 7 Novegro Nuclear Information Project Nuke Nuova pista Nuove rotte Nuovi aeroporti Nuovo stadio O Leary O'Leary OCSE OMS ONG OPEC Oasi naturalistiche Obama Olbia Olivi One Sky One Work Onework Oneworks Oneworld Onlit Open Sky Operatore di sistema Operatori Operazione Bridge Operazione Cargo Operazione Mare Sicuro Operazioni de-ice Ordigni Ordigni bellici Ordigni esplosivi Ordigni inesplosi Ordinanza Ordinanza ENAC Ordini Ore di servizio Orio Center Orio a ò Serio Orio al Serio Orio al Srerio Orsoni Ospedali Osservazioni Osservazioni VIA Osservzioni Ossidi Azoto Ossidi di zolfo Ostacoli Ostacoli alla Navigazione Ottawa Overrun Overshoot Ozono P 2.5 P 92 P 92 JS P92 PA 18 PA 32 PAA PAN PASQA PC PEA PEE PFC PGT PIL PM 10 PM 2 PM 2.5 PMx PNA PNA; ENAC PNL PRA PSA PSZ Paesaggio Pagamento tariffe Paino Strategico Aeroportuale Paino di Rischio Paino di rischio aeronautico Pakistan International Airline Pala eolico Palais Lumiere Palermo Palette Paltop Pannelli forovoltaici Pannelli fotovoltaici Pannelli solari Pantelleria Panthera Paolo Gentiloni Paolo Nicolò Paracadute Paracadutista Paracadutisti Paramotore Parapendio Parcheggi Parcking Parco Volo Parco del Sile Parco el Sile Parma Parma Urban District Partecipate Pasian di Prato Passeggeri Passeggero Passera Passerella Patologie associate Pattugli acrobatica Pattuglia Acrobatica Pattuglia Acrobatica Nazionale Pattuglia Nazionale Acrobatica Paul Eschenfelder Pavoncella Pegasus Airline Pegognaga Pendenza Pendenza longitudinale Pendenza trasversale Pentagono People Mover Peoplefly Perdita carburante Perdita pezzi Perduca Peretola Pericoli alla navigazione Pericolo alla navigazione aerea Personale di volo Perugia Pescara Pesceluna Peschiera Borromeo Petizione Petizione Riserva Litorale Romano Pezzi di Ricambio Piacenza Piaggio 180 Piaggio Aerospace Pian d Rischio Piana Sana Piani di Rischio Piano Aeroporti Piano AeroportiCampoformido Piano Emergenza Aeroportuale Piano Emergenza Esterno Piano Emergenza Interno Piano Governo Territorio Piano Nazional Aeroporti Piano Nazionale Aeroporti Piano Nazionale Aeroporti Italiano Piano Nazionale Aeroproti Piano Ostacoli Piano Protezione Civile Piano Provinciale di incidente aereo Piano Strategico Piano Strategico Aeroportuale Piano acustico Piano antivolatili Piano di Azione Piano di Emergenza Piano di Emergenza Aeroportuale Piano di Governo del Territorio Piano di Riscchio Piano di Rischi Piano di Rischio Piano di Rischio aeronautico Piano di Riscio Piano di emergenza esterno Piano di ischit. 715o Piano di richio Piano di rischio terzi Piano di rsichio Piano emergenza Piano evacuazione Piano i Rischio Piano terzi Piantagioni Piazza San Marco Piazza San Pietro Piazzali Pietro Cavallo Pietro Modiano Pilatus PC 6 Pilatus PC6 Pilota ubriaco Pilotaggio remoto Piloti Piloti malati Pino di Sviluppo Piogge Piper Piper 22 Piper 28 Piper 30 Piper 34 Piper 46 Piper Malibu Piper PA 28 - 161 Warrior Piper PA 42 Piper PA 46 Piper PA46T Pipistrel Pirellone Pisa Pista Pista 06 Pista 12 Pista 24 Pista 25 Pista 28 Pista Apron Pista a mare Pista chiusa Pista corta Pista di sci Pista lunga Pista obliqua Pista sull'acqua Piste Piste sature Pitts Model 12 Pizzarotti Poiane Polaria Poligoni Poligono Poligono Teulada Polizia Polo Aeronautico Polo Aerospaziale Polo Chimico Polo Intermodale Polo Lombardo Polo Nordest Polo Universitario Polo aeroportuale Polo aeroportuale Nordest Polverini Pomodoro Ponte Vecchio Pontecagnano Popolazione Porta di Gehry Portaerei Cavour Postali Posti auto Pratica UE Pratica di Mare Precipita Precipita velivolo Precipitato Predator Prefetto Prefettura Preiminary Report Preliminary Report Premariacco Premium class Prescrizione Prescrizioni Aeronavigabilità Prescrizioni navigabilità Presidente Presidente Aeroclub Italia Presidente del Consiglio Prevenzione incendi Priceconomics Primario Primo volo Privacy Privatizzare Privatizzazione Privatizzazioni Proattiva Probabilità Procedimento Penale Procedura Impatto Ambientale Procedura VIA Procedura antirumore Procedura di VIA Procedura di Valutazione Ambientale Procedure antirumore Processi Procura Procura di Padova Profilo di decollo Profling Promozione Proposta mitigazione Propototipo Propulsori Proseal 700 Prot-in Protezione civile Prototipo Prova motori Proventi Public Safety Zone Puglia Punta Raisi Puntatori laser Putin QBR Team Qatar Qatar Airlines Quantas Quaranta Quarta pista Quatar Airways Quintavalle Quinto di Treviso R 22 RACOON RANCH RAeS RCEA RESA RIGA RIR RPA RQ 170 RV 7 RV 8 RVR Raccolta firme Raccomandazioni Raccomandazioni di Sicurezza Radar Radar Tracking Radar track Raddoppio Raddoppio sedime Radiazioni Radiazioni ionizzanti Radioattivi Raffaele Cantone Raffaele Guariniello Raffiche di vento Raggi cosmici Raggi laser Raggi ultravioletti Raggio laser Raggio verde Ragusa Rapporto Ambientale Rapporto EEA Rapporto ENAC Rapporto Informativo Rapporto Informativo 2012 Rayanair Re-fuelling ReTe Reaper MQ 9 Recinti Record mondiale Redecesio Referendum Reggio Calabria Regionali Regione Emilia Romagna Regione FVG Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia Regione Lazio Regione Lombardia Regione Puglia Regione Sardegna Regione Sicilia Regione Toscana Regione Veneto Regioni Registrazione Registrazione droni Regolamento Regolamento 139/2014 Regolamento Droni Regolamento ENAC Regolamento UE Regolamento UE n. 139/2014 Regolamento UE n. 598/2014 Reims Cessna F-150L Ulraleggeri Reject take off Rejected Take off Relazione Relazione BSCI Relazione inchiesta Relazioni Relazioni Intermedie Remote Airport Concept of Operation Remote control Renzo Dentesano Renzo Piano Reparti volo Report 2016 Residenti Resilienza Restrizioni operative Rete centraline Rete di Monitoraggio Rete operativa Retedi monitoraggio Reti Reti di monitoraggio Reti monitoraggio Retrazione carrello Rettifica Reverse Revisione spesa Riattaccata Ricavi Ricerca naturalistica Ricerche Richard Branson Richard Westgate Richiesta documenti Richio individuale Ricorso Ricorso TAR Ricorso al TAR Ridolfi Riduzione voli Rientra dal volo Rientro dal decollo Rientro dal volo Rifacimento pista Rifiuti tossici Rifornimento Rifornimento carburante Rigel Riggio Rimborsi Rimini Rimozione Rio de Janeiro Ripartizione voli Riposa in pace Ripresa voli Risanamento Risarcimenti Risarcimento Risarcimento danni Rischi terzi Rischio Trezi Rischio archeologico Rischio collettivo Rischio incidenti Rischio individuale Rischio sociale Rischio terz Rischio terzi Rischio volatili Riscorso al TAR Riserva Grifoni Riserva Naturale Riserva Naturale Lazio Risk assement Risk assesment Risk assessment Risk assessmnet Risk collision Risk collsion Risoluzione Risoluzioni Risorvoli Ritardi Ritardi dei voli Rivolo di Osoppo Rivolto Rizzo Robert Behler Roberta Carli Roberto Vergari Robin Robin 400 Robinson Robinson 22 Robinson R 22 Rochi dei Legionari Rogo Pineta Roll Royce Rolls Royce Rolls Royce 770 Rolls-Royce Roma Roma Capitale Romagnoli Romo Paolo Nicola Ronchi dei Legionari Rondoni Rosario Crocetta Rottamare Rottami Rotte Rotte decollo Rotte sperimentali Royalties Ruas Hero Rullaggio Rumore a terra Rumore aereo Rumore bianco Rumore notturno Runway End Safety Area Runway Excursion Runway excusrsion Runway safety Russia Ryanair Ryanair 4102 Ryanir S.Angelo SAA SAC SACAL SACBO SAFA SAGAT SAPR SARA SARAS SASE SAT SATAC SAVE SDAC SEA SEAF SERA SESE SEVESO II SF 260 AM SF 260 EA SF 260EA SH 101 SH 212 SIC SID SLA SMS SO2 SOGEAP STASA SU 25 SWY SYMA X5C Safety Safety Alert Safety Management System Safety Performance 2017 Safety Plan Safety performance Safety report Sala controllo Salami slice Salerno Salerno Pontecagnano Salmone Salute; Cittadini Salvataggio Samsung Samsung Note 2 Samsung S7 Samusng Note 7 San Angelo San Francisco International Airport San Giusto San Martin San Pietro Sandrini Santa Cristina Santa Monica Sanzione Sanzioni Sapienza Airport Risk Analisys Saratow Airline Sardegna Saturazione Saverio Romano Savety Savogna d'Isonzo Savorgnan de Brazza Savorgnan di Brazzà Sbaglia aeroporto Scalea Scali minori Scalo chiuso Scarico carburante Scatole nere Schianto Schianto al suolo Schianto in decollo Schipol Sciopero Scivoli Scomparso dai radar Scomparso in mare Scongelamento Scongelamneto Scontro in volo Scoperchiamento Scoperchiamento tetti Scoppio a bordo Scoppio gomma Scoppio gomme Scramble Scuola Marescialli Scuola dei Marescialli Scuole Seconda pista Securiry Securitu Security Security scanner Securrity Sedime Sedime aeroportuale Sedimi Segnalazione eventi aeronautici Segnalazioni Segrate Semicarrello Senato Seneca Senigallia Sentenza Sentenza Quintavalle Sentenza TAR Sentinel Senza carrello Separazioni laterali e verticali Separazioni standard Sequestro Serbatoi Serbatoi carburante Serbatoi combustibile Serbatoi esplosivi Serbatoio Sergio Costa Serracchiani Servitù militari Sesar Sesto Fiorentino Sesto Imolese Sestri Sfalcio erba Sfonda vetrata Sforamento Sforamento ostacoli Sgancio aliante Sghiaccamento Sghiacciamento Sghiacciamneto Shaanxi Y-8-200F Sheraton Shorts 330 Siai Marchetti 208 Siamo Somma Sibari Siberie Sicilia Sicurezza Sicurezza Informatica Sicurezza del volo Sicurezza proattiva Siena Siena Ampugnano Sierra 2002 Sigonella Sile Silenzio cimiteriale Silk AIr Italy Silvia Noferi Simulazioni Sindacati Sindaci Sindaco Sindaco Falchi Sindaco Nardella Sindrome classe economica Sindrome del viaggiatore Singapore Singapore Airlines Single Sky Sistema monitoraggio Sit-in Skatebord Sky Leader 200 Skyleader Skytrack Skytrax Small Small Regional Airport Smaltimento Smart Defence Smartphone Smog Soccorsi Soccorsi a mare Soccorso Soccorso Alpino Società di gestione Societal Risk Societal Ruisk Soffioni Sogas Sogear Solar Impulse Solaris Somatogravic illusions Somatogravic risk Somma Campagna Somma Lombardo Sommacampagna Sommcampagna Sondaco Nardella Sonno Sopratassa carburante Sopravento Sorvoli Sospensione Sospensione dei voli Sospensione licenza Sospensione voli Sostegni Sostegni ai voli Sostegni finanziari Sostegni pubblici Sostegno Sostenibilità Sottosuolo Sottovento South African Airline Southwest Airlines Sovratemperature Sovrattassa Sovrattassa carburante Sovvenzioni SpaceShip Two Spanair Spatial Distribution of Aircraft Crashes Spazio Aereo Spazioporto Spegnimento motori Spendig Review Spending review Sperimentazione Sperimentazione decolli Sperimentazione voli Spessotto Spessotto Arianna Spinta inversa Sponsor Stadi Stadi di calcio Stadio Stadio di calcio Staff Stagni Stall recovery Stallo motori Standard operativi Standards Statistiche Statistiche 2016 Stato di Allarme Stato di Emergenza Stato di Incidente Statore Stazioni Stazioni di servizio Stealth Stewardess Stime di traffico Stiva Stivaggio Stop ampliamento Stop notturni Stop take off Stop take-off Stop voli Stopway Storione del Sile Storm Storni Strategici Strategico Strategie aeroportuali Streal 2 Streal 3 Strip Strip area Striscia la Notizia Studio Naturalistico Ambientale Studio epidemiologico Studio naturalistico Studio sulla salute Subappalti Sud Tirolo Suicidio Sukhoi 100 Sukhoi Superjet 100-95 Sukkoi Sunchem Sunexpress Suolo Super 100 Superfici Limitazione Ostacoli Superfici Limitazioni Ostacoli Superjet 100 Supplemento carburante Supporti Supporto Surriscaldamento Sussidi Sversamenti Sversamento Sversamento carburante Sversamento liquidi Svezia Svizzera Swearingen Metro SA226 Swiftair Swissair T1 T2 TAF TAR TAR Brescia TAR Lazio TAR Lombardia TAR Toscana TAR Veneto TIA TRE TSA TSB TU 204 TVP TWA Tablet Tablets Taglio voli Talon T 38 Taming Aviation Taranto Targhe alterne Tariffe Tariffe aeree Tariffe aeroportuali Task force Tassa aeroportuale Tassa d'imbarco Tassa imbarco Tassa passeggero Tassa rumore Tassazione Tasse Tasse imbarco Taxibot Taxiway Taxyway Techno Sky Tecma P 92 Tecnam Tecnam 2002 Sierra Tecnam 92 Tecnam P-92 Tecnam p 62 Tegola e volanti Tegole Tegole risucchiate Tegole volanti Tempi colo Tempi di servizio Tempi di volo Temporali Termina 3 Terminal Terminal 1 Terminal 3 Termovalorizzatori Terracina Terrapieno Territorio Terrorismo Terza pista Tessera Tessera City Tesserino Ingresso Aeroportuale Test mentali Test psicologico Tetti Tetti scoperchiati Tetto The Mall The Washington Post Thetis Ticino Tilt Timone di coda Tipo A Tipo M Tipo V Toboga Toccaceli Top 20 Tor Sapienza Toran Torcello Torino Torino Valentino Torio Tornado Torre Torre Cardin Toscana Toscochimica Touch&Go Tower Tracciati radar Traffico Traffico 2015 Traffico 2017 Traffico aereo Traffico droga Traffico low cost Traffico passeggeri Traffico rifiuti Training Training manual Tralicci TranAsia Airways Trancia cavi elettrici TransAsia Airways Transazione Transiti Trapani Trapani Birgi Trasporti Trasporto aereo Trasporto aereo. Comitati Tre Croci Trent 1000 Treviso Treviso Canova Treviso-Canova Tribunale Tribunale del Lavoto Tribunali Tributi Trieste Trieste Airport Trieste Ronchi Trieste-Airport Trigora Trigoria Trigoria Cessna 650 Trivellazioni Trolley Trombosi del viaggiatore Trota Iridea Trote Trote iridea Trump Tsunami Tubi Pitot Tupolev 134 Tupolev 154 Tupolev 154B Turbina Turbine Turbolenza Turismo Turismo FVG Turismo FVG Tuta alare Tutela ambientale Tutela passeggeri Tutele ambientali Twenty Twin Otter UAL UARS UAS UAS; Droni UAV UE UE 139/2'14 UE Safety List UFAC UFO UILtrasporti UKAB ULM UNC UP UPA UPAS USA USAF USL UVA Ucraina Udine Ullage Ultra Ultraleggeri Ultraleggeri avanzati Ultraleggero Ultraleggero Avanzato Ultraleggri Uniformi Unione consumatori United Airlines Università Upset recovery Ural Airlines Uranio impoverito Urbe Usmaf Ustica Utente Utenti Utenza V.I.A. V2 VAI VAS VDR VDS VIA VIA; VAS VIS VOC VVFF Valigie Valore edonico Valter Battistoni Valutazione Ambientale Strategica Valutazione impatto ambientale Vano carrello Varallo Pombia Varesotto Varsavia Vasche Maccarese Vaticano Vendita azionaria 45% Veneto Venezia Venezia Calcio Venezia Tessera Venezia-Tessera Verdi Vergari Vergiate Verona Verona Catullo Vespe Vettori Vetusta Vetusto Vi Via E.A. 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