The Wrong Stuff

The "wrong" stuff can be defined as a demonstration of the "right" stuff at the wrong time. If you're still confused at this point, it's probably because you haven't read "The Right Stuff" by Thomas Wolfe. This book deals with the U.S. space program and the astronauts that took part in the great race to catch the Russians. It's a great book and I would strongly advise you to read it at the first opportunity as it offers many insights into the mind of some of the world's greatest test pilots and astronauts.

"The Right Stuff" that Wolfe is referring to in his title is the ability of the NASA pilots to remain calm and unrattled in the face of impending disaster. Na matter what the emergency, (even in some cases, certain impending death), their voices and actions betray no panic and, at times, even a peculiar indifference to the chaotic happenings around them. Wolfe attributes these characteristics to the psychological makeup of a career pilot and I can find no fault with his conclusions in this regard. So, what than, pray tell, is the "Wrong Stuff"?

Again, let me reiterate the first sentence of this article: "The Wrong Stuff is the demonstration of the Right Stuff at the wrong time."

All pilots stive to discipline themselves to remain calm and functional under the stress of unexpected or unusual happenings in their airborne environment. But sometimes, they intentionally under-react to demonstrate how much "Right Stuff" they have at their command which can lead to disastrous consequences. As a case in point, let's look at over-run accidents that occur due to aborted take-offs.

In the reports filed on this type of accident, is the invariable comment that maximum braking was not applied until too late.

If you peruse the cockpit transcripts, you will note that he crews, in almost all cases, recognized the need to abort but were slow in getting off the power and onto the brakes. In some cases, valuable seconds were eaten up as they exchanged comments on the situation before reacting. A case of the "Right stuff" at the wrong time.

Lest you scoff at this one example, take a moment and read some of the cockpit transcripts of other accidents. Note how often the crew appears completely relaxed, even to the point of distussing their personal projects and aspirations, while their flight brings them closer and closer to the edge of disaster. In some cases, the crew may have been totally unaware that they had made some heinous mistake, but in many instances they were well aware of what was happening but were too busy displaying their own "Right Stuff" to take immediate action to rectify the situation. It makes for admirable dialogue in the report but is little consolation to the departed participant's friends and family after the accident.

There is far too much "Right Stuff" displayed by pilots in weather related accidents. If the previous flight on approach made the runway, too many pilots feel totally obligated to do the same despite any comments made by the first airplane's crew about turbulence, icing, low visibility or any other weather related problems. This is especially prevalent if the first aircraft flies in the colours of a major competitor.

The "he made it, I'll make it" attitude, is an especially dangerous manifestation of the "Right Stuff" that leads to ignoring published minimums and pressing on regardless. In too many cases, it has led to a broken airplane on the approach path which should have been executing a missed approach.

Let's go on to the category of accidents caused by aircraft malfunctions. A fault occurs and the crew seemingly almost ignores it, other than to comment on its appearance, and goes right on discussing whatever topic was previously being discussed. When the subject has been exhausted, one or the other will finally make a causal suggestion, expressed in the mildest of terms, as to what they should do about the problem. A common sentiment expressed in accident transcripts, is that the problem is: A) Something that's happened before to them and such a solution worked. B) A pain in the ass but nothing to really worry about. C) A suggestion to fix the problem that appears nowhere in the approved company emergency checklist. D) An unsolicited attempt by a junior crew-member to reset the breaker, tap on the gauge, or other-wise rectify the situation. All comments and actions are performed in the most off-hand manner as befits one imbued with the "Right Stuff".

The recurring theme in many accidents involving professional pilots is the unfortunate tendency to put off immediate rectifying actions when dealing with seemingly minor events. As most accidents reports substantiate, this can have a snowball effect until the crew is totally over-come with problems. Decisive actions must be taken after due consideration but they must be taken quickly in some instances or the situation will rapidly deteriorate. Even the wrong action, can, at times, be less harmful than total inaction while the pilot feigns disinterest.

There is nothing inherently wrong in the sentiments expressed by any of the crew members in our little scenarios. What is wrong however, is the recurring theme that too many pilots like the Japanese Samurai, put "losing face" ahead of their professional instincts. Too many times, an aircraft has been lost with the crew believing themselves to be in full control. I am not advocating that pilots became excited or frantic when dealing with problems. A modicum of calmness and coolness must prevail in any situation that calls for emergency action or chaos will be the inevitable result. But like anything, moderation ia still the best policy,

The "Right Stuff" is a valuable part of a professional pilot's character and will, rightfully, remain so. But take care that the "Right Stuff" does not become the "Wrong Stuff" leading you into mistaking coolness for complacency.

Index: Cockpit Management Courtesy Carbol-Wings